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CHINA REVISITED:

A NEW ERA IN ASIA

We are ln the open-season in politics.
allegation fly thtck and fast.
directions.

The arr?ws of

Poltttcal pot-shots come from all

North, south, east and west, the land is strewn with

tattered public reputations.
I have no inclination to jotn in the personal carnage.
it i s over our national ills will still be with us.
not be made any easter by the wounds of politics.

When

Their cure will
In any event, this

is a bipartisan audience--at least, I hope there are a few Democrats
present .

It would be appr Jpriate in the circumstances, I think, to

eschew the poltt1cal in my remarks.

Let me proceed on the principle

that people who live in the glass houses

or

national politics should

not throw stones, especially at a convention of glass makers.
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It 1a my

talij to you about a nation

where recycling is not an issue because waste has been recycled since
time immemorial.

It ts a nation where neither bottles nor anything

else of value 1a thrown away.

It is a nation several thousand years

older than the United States and many times more densely populated,
yet whose rivers and streams run teeming wi th f i sh.
This year the international roads have all led to that country
and to its capital of Peking.

There is an ancient Chinese proverb

which loosely translated says that ' the journey of a thousand miles
begins with the first step."

In a shift of history, the first maj or

step towards China was taken for th ls nat Lon by Presi.dent Nlxon and
I applaud hlm for tt.

When a similar shift is also noted in the

President's approach to Soviet Russia, we begin to have some measure
of the magnitude of the transition which is underway in the lnternational scene.
The President's vlsit to Peking set off a chain reaction.
Subsequent missions were undertaken by the biparti san leadership& of
the Senate and the House.

Addittonal visits of international

- 3 significance have been

u~~~t~~untries,

most recently,

that of Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan.
To grasp what is taking place today, these v1sits must be seen
against the backgr~und of psst policy toward ChinA.
the American political scene was dominated by
China ?'

~ne

At mid-century,

theme:

Stentorian voices asked the question from one end

natton to the other.

l~ st

'Who
o~

this

Scapegoats were dragged out of government

agencies and academic life to be paraded before Congressional committees and held up t o public scorn.

We sought an explanation for the

fa ilure of a policy i n this fashion because none other seemed plausibl e at the t ime.

Fresh from the great military triumphs of World

War II, we were not yet ready--as a nat ion--to face the fact that
three-quarters

fa

b l111~n

people c >uld

n~t

be won or lost i n the

mid-twentieth century by anybody except themselves.

It was incon-

ceivable to us that anything except betrayal could be at fault in
the 'loss of China. '

- 4 So the idea that

had been allowed

to slip through our fingers into the hands of Moscow became firmly
imbedded in the nation's Asian policies.

So, too, did we come to

accept the illusion that China was recoverable by us, in due course,
by ostracizing or flailing the government in Peking as
and

11

unleashing' Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek .

11

un- Chinece'

These concepts were

expressed in a policy of building a military wall around China and
preparing, on Taiwan, forces of the National Government to retake the
mainland.
In time, this obsessive policy led us to send tens of thousands
of Americans and Chinese, not to speak of Koreans to their deaths
unnecessarily ln the rash extension of the Korean war beyond the 38th
parallel .

It led us to form a chain of Asian treaties whose links

were Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and nations of Southeast Asia--all
weak and all dependent on the United States for survival .

U. S. bases

were established, willy nilly, in countries throughout the area.
of thousanda of U.

s.

forces were deployed to man the bases.

Tens

Tens

- 5 of billions of dollars
aid.

acti vi t i es and f oreign

Huge staffs of U. S. government administrators, military advis ors,

construction workers and others were sentt

administer the aid .

The so-call ed ''conta i nment policy" for the Far East which had
been prec1pit3ted by an expression of i nd ignant public avers ion to a
revolut ionat·y China led us, step by step, i nto the terrible tragedy
of Indochina.

Nowhere along the line--and I include the Congress

with the various presidential admini strations and the permanent bureaucracy of the government--di d we find the wi sdom and strength to
break the i nertia .

\ole failed even t o restra i n thd.s pr·,cesa until

more than half a m1ll1on Americans were bogged down i n Indochina and
our country was confronted with the greatest i nternal divisiveness
s i nce the Civil War.
We were drawn i nto a vortex by what was seen as a ''lost
a rec kless, beligerent communist monster, set loose by Moscow.
i r ony was that at the very same time, the leaders

~n

China,
The

Peking were re-

garding themselves as trying only t o assert control over traditional

- 6 territories and

atte~pti~~df:J!:

unified nat ion

capable of meeting the needs of the Chi nese people.

Our policy

ot "conta i ning Chi na '' whether expressed in Korea, Tai wan or Vi et
Nam, i n nuclear bases i n Okinawa or in U-2 flights over Chinese
territory, was interpreted by Peking as a vi cious extension ot
Western imperialist efforts to dominate Chlna .
a new generation as the number one enemy.

We were held up to

For the first time in

decades, Chinese children were encouraged t o hate the government
of the once "beautiful country ' as the name "America '' translates
into Chinese.
That is in the past.

The raw confrontation is now over.

Together with the Peking government, we have embarked on what is
likely t o be a long slow journey of restoration.

President Nixon's

visit to Chi na early this year was a symbolic act of the highest
sign1f1cance in thi s process.

When the President and the Chinese

Premier touched glasses in toasts of mutual friendship, the death
knell of the containment policy in Asia tolled across the Pacific.

- 7 As I have noted,

~oQ1.~

President to China last April and

t~y.

1 l :ership followed the
Let me give you, now, a

few first-hand lopresslons of the changes which have taken place
,6·

in the lives or over 800,000/f'p eople--one fourth of the world's
population.

I do so in order to provide some indication of the

kind or nation with which the world must reckon.

What the joint

leadership concluded differs little from what other Americans have
found in v sits to the new China.
To digress tor a moment, I might mention that I served as a
Marine in the old China .
Marines.

Ever since I have been par tial to the

When I was in the Navy, I never rose above the rank of

Seaman 2nd Class.

During my Army httch, I remained a buck private.

But the Marines, recognizing certain exceptional qualities in my
soldiering, elevated me for the rest of my military career to the
rank or P. F. C.
I must add that my exposure to the old

Chin~

was not l1mtted

to a KP's view or the warlord era when Chinese scavenged the garbage

- 8 cans of the mess halls

~~!21~J(

went again, as a young

Congressman on a mission for President Roosevelt, to a diaeaeeridden, famine-stricken, wartorn free China, traveling the old
Burma Road and many parts or the West, spec1f1cally Yunnan and
Szechwan.

Again, shortly after the Japanese surrender, I visited

Peking and Tientsin once more and Tsingtao on the Northeast coast.
The contrast between the old China and China today, is
extraordinary.

To be sure, the Chinese People's Republic is more

closely controlled and highly organized than ever before.
lectual and artistic freedom are non-existent.

Intel-

Nor is there

representative government and tree enterprise, as we know them.
However, if we have learned one truth from our experiences in Asia,
it should be that American values are not necessarily adaptable
wholesale in Asia.
What is of greatest relevance to the Chinese people at this
time Is that the present system has led to the ava·lab1l1ty of
adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer goods.

It
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transportatton, electrification, and the like.

It has developed

an economy which is capable or manufacturing, out of Chinese
resources, thousands of products, from a pin to nuclear devices
and space satellites and the mach1ne tools to

pr~duce

them.

What is relevant, too, ls that the superstructure of

contr~l

is manned, not by a consp·cuous and highly pr vileged elite as
in the past but by men and women

wb~

dress like them and live with them.

l'Jork among the people, who
Conformity there ls, as there

has always been, tor the great numbers of Chinese but it is not
produced by a visible whip.

Indeed, I do not think I saw more than

one or two !ire-arms anywhere in China
Wh~t

in \'lork.

d~ring

the entire visit.

1s most striking is a universal sense of participation

A bona fide national family la emerging, with n "one for

all and all for one

concept of society.

The present system, 1n

short, seems to have succeeded in undergirding the personal pride
of the Chinese in China.

As Chou En-lai put 1t, 'The Chinese people

- 10 -

can stand up again.

As

croo~~~:lf

seems strong, dynamic,

unified and virtually classless.
As this vast uplift hns gained in momentum, nnttons hove
bent a path to China's door.

For us, the time was over-ripe for

the President's initiative.

For several years, hosttl1ty between

the united States and China has been receding.
President's v!sit, this
ogre in China's eyes.

c~untry

Long

bef~re

the

has ceased to be an unmitiaated

The focus of Peking's concern began to shift

elsewhere a decade ago, notably to the Soviet Union and to Japan.
only the intrusion of the 111-foted Vietnamese involvement concealed
the extent of the shift.
As for the Soviet Union, at first, the Chinese leaders felt
to that country
bound closely/by what see~ed to be a

c~mmon

ideology.

Moreover,

the relationship was cemented by the unifying force of a
outside world.
diverged.

h~stile

Over the years, however, ideological concepts

A serious

cl~~vage

developed between the two nations and

long-standing border questions and other irritants came into vlew.
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The Soviet aid-program

r•rst welcomed,

came to be seen n Ch

n~

high a price tag for

nfer or g oda and technologies.

program hac
f

t

as something of a fraud which carried too
While the

ong s nee been d scontlnued and the Russ ans pa d in

11 and sent homo, the sense

f being cheated still rankles among

the Ch<nese.
l..fost ser· OllC, one million Soviet and Mon3oltan armed forces
on China's border 3re nj longer

reg~rded

as communist allies.

the contrary, these forces now loom as a menace of major
on a par with, if not greater than U.

s.

On

pr~oortlons

mtlltary bases tn Asia or

the prospect of a rearmed Japan.
As tor China and Japan, the recent meeting of Premier Chou
and Prlme Minister Tanaka &ets the stage for further changes in the
special ties of the latter country with the United States.

Since

World War II, the Japanese have looked primarily to this nat on not
only for securtty but ala- for the great portion of the foreign trade
which supports their economic well-being.

On the other side of the

coin, Japan has
relatlons.

lead in international

Now, an immense

ec~nomtc

dynamism has developed in Japan .

Japanese productive capacity ranks third tn the world and Japanese
trade is flourishtng on

~11

continents.

This economic growth makes

possible greater independence in international policies; indeed, it
makes greater independence necessary.
The political settlement which has been achieved with China
foreshadows the end of the unequal and quasi-dependent re1ationship
with the United States.

On the one hand this change ts welcomed

lft- both here and tn J apan.
the future may hold

h~

On the other hand, anxieties over what

led to some mutual recrimination.

the r es ponsibility of diplomacy and statecraft to hold in
tendencies of th1s kind .

It is
chec~

On that score, I must say in a11 candor,

that there has been some slippage on the part of the Administration.
I can conceive of no greater tragedy for the Pacific region
than that the inevitable transition tn the U. S. - Japanese relatlonship terminate in its dlsruption.

To avoid such an outcome,

- 13 it

w~uld

cc~no~

be he pful

t~

Jap~m'

s great

c achievements · n recent years have been pinching at

sensitive polit ca., :1nd c:>mmerc al nerves in thts c·:mntry.

Pre-

occupied for too lo!'lg l>!1 th Viet rtam, we have awakened to dlsc'>ver
that

01r

industry 1& no longer able to compete

the Japanese.
manpower and

n mnny fields with

While we have been wnst ng our substance, BK lls,
ndustrial crenttvity tn Indochina, the Japanese h9ve

been putting •nsigntficant outlays 'nto military purposes.

Their

economic energies have been concentrated, 'nstead, on peaceful
production and trade.

It is not surprising, in the

circ~~stances,

that for the last six years, the United States has had a bilat er al
trade deficit with

Japan~

which reached tn all-tlme high of

$3.2 billlon last year.
Japnn's reestablishment of

relatl~ns

with China, in my

judgment, ls in the interests of all concerned.
open still

m~re

The door will now

widely to a S no-Japanese trade which 1s already

large and growing.

In so doing, it

~·ill

lessen the pressure of

Japanese compctit on
st

it may well

ul tc the Soviet Union into a heightened economic

nterchange

w th Japan, espec ·ally in connect lon tith the Soviet Maritime

Provinces and S1berta.
These adjustments can go far to untangle the trade lines o
the Far Pacific wh ch were distorted by ideological conflicts in
the aftermath of Uorld War II.

Moreover, they dovetail with the

clearing away of trade barriers

bet~een

an~

the United States and China

the United States and the Soviet Union.

T ken all together,

these shifts could lay a firm economic base for peaceful relationshlps between Japsn, Ch na, the SQviet Union and the United States
tn the Western Pacific.

The question is can there also be found

in all four countries the polittcal wit and diplomatic wisdom to build
a quadripartite base of otability in that region?
Early steps will involve adjustments in security relationships, notably in the derense treatiec between Japan and the United
States and the Soviet Union and China.

These treaties were entered

nt

n

different

as the Japanese -

U. S. relationship 1s concerned, it ts ltkely that the U. S. nuclear
safeguards f r Japan \il, re .ain s·gnificant for some time.
th

D

Outs i de

wnbrella, hol'ze::er, it seeres to me that U. S. bases on Japanese

territ ry, t1hlch have already declined in lmp::>rtance, will have
lout

dditjonal s·gn·ficonce as a

res~lt

of the Chou - Tanaka and

the Chou - Nixon communiques .
Present

develop~ents am~ng

have set in motion repercussions

the larger countries of Asia
else~here.

After two decades of

unrestrained invective, for example, the two KJreas are talking
amicably.

Th~iland

has accepted a Chinese

table tennis team to Peking.
panted by government

nvltat on to take its

The ping-pong players will be accom-

e~1ssaries

carrying not only paddles and

ping-pong balls , but, in all probability, briefs on Sino-Thai
international issues.

It will be only a matter of time, I should

think, before relations are normalized betl'1een China and Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.

- 16 In sh rt, fro
o:.~t

on~do ~.:lf

ocSed pottctes are )n the way out.

hot~ever,

Pncirtc to the other,

et"l1 remains

\l.lh~t

ntact,

are this nation'r; m lttary nd :>ther arrangements around

the rtm of the People's Repub lc of
Adm1niEtrat1on or 'ts

success~r,

Ch~na.

t w uld

examination of these arrangements, indeed

The next step for this
sec~,

a~l

will lnvolve an

the tools--the

treaties and other measures--by which ant'quated doctrines ore
still being pursued tn Asia.

The cntttng edge of these tools will

have to be reset *o that they may be applied

n

tollow-thr~ugh

Dn

the President's lnttiattve and w'th relevance to the contemporAry
realit·es of the Far East.
It would be well to bear in mind
the United States is, and

to~tll

n th s connection that

cont nue to be, a PacU' c power.

We should cease now to act as an Asian power as we have been trying
to

d~

for the past quarter of a century.

Trte fact is that we have

no vital,-I stress the w-rd vitnl--'nterest on the mainland of As1a
except to extricate ourselves from the quicksands of Indoch1na.
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n

eet our v;..tal
~ia,

Pncifi~tg.~?nJf diotlnct

those

they are v·tal--aoes not require us to contlnue to maintain

h..mdrcds of thousands of ar eo forces nnd

vcr 10::> major bases

throughout the P.estern Pacific at a cost of billions
ann~ally.

fro

It does not compel us

t~

~f

dollars

g ve vaat quantities of arms

an1 other wasteful aid to dubious governments.

The deployment of

our military forces and our resources should be matched to contemporary needs and not to the myths of the past.
careful, in-depth

st~dies

It is time for

of all of our non-nuclear security

c m:nitments in Asia and it \iould be

my

hope that such studies will

be undertaken in the Senate and elsewhere during the next Congress .
Over the hopeful developnents
the cloud of

Indochin~.

n An1a, there still

hong~

Our natlon remains entrapped by its own

s utheast Asian policies. To be sure, feHcr Americans than in the
post now die in Indochina each week and that is cause for gratitude.
That does not excuse us, however, from facing the fundamental insue.
hat \":e L'lust ask ourselves bluntly is

~1hy

any American should die

- 18 in Ind?ch na.
a w r

~htch

"hy
s

n:~•-:

th~Q.eJt:e

0

looked up'"'n ss a m c.tnl{e by a

The continued
ong-ronge

nv?

'ntere~tE ~r

the wor,d and "thorne.

or

l\t

n 1 volve ent tn

tn !ndoch'na lorks against the

v~ment

this n3tion
It

o"'t all Americans.

s deb

n~t

nly

~ i.t"ltinz

n

but

Ac~a

through~ut

our ec:1n'"'my at the rate

lcact some $8 btll1,-,n a year no,'l, '"'r nbout $tlO out of the

pockcto of every

~~n,

w~man,

9nd ch,ld in the n9t1on.

bu1ld1ng up public obligntions which not only feed
which w<ll carry well into the ?lst Century.
helping to destroy the lives
in a war 1-1h ch, , ess

~mo

~r

thousands 0f

We are

nflntion but

The involvement ts
every week

Ind~chtnece

less, dr aws d1 st1nct1ons between combatant

and n:m-combatnnt, "smart bombs • notu thst:md1ng.

Llke

3

cancer,

the war eats away at the v tality of our nat onal life and the trust
of Americans 'n each other and in their government .

It 1s feeding

on the nation's soul, str1pp1ng away the c?ncern that has made
America, America--a decent
wherever they may be.

c~ncern

for the l1fe of all human beings

The lon&er

more

11c

ou.r::c ... veo at a d.uu.dva.utagc in
us

n the P.at:L. c.

w.e Un ved

the So•iet Union, Japan, and China.

It is golng to tax us

deal lith that complex in a

~ay ~hich

serves

~'lith

the fullest to

well-belng of

one foot in the trap of Indochina.

We have made a start--a g:;,od start.

face up t

tt~

t~

.e can ill afford t.:> approach the new situatL:m in

the t.estern Pacific

t

te are all

Our fate: ure interH )VCn · n a cccplex or c mmou

and divergent intci·csts.

th ... s ntltion.

the real problems .fac·ng

Tne \.atera of thr1t ocean touch the uh res of

Staten~

Pacific natL. ns.

tac~ltng

pluce

\'lc

i!c have begun, belatedly,

the present and to look to the future.

l-1c have a

long way to go but the first step is the longest and the most
dLf-cult.

\ e can continue with assurance along this path on which

l.e have entered 1n Asia, recognizing that it is but a sector of the

path of brotherhood, mutual understanding and equality ror all men
c ery. here.

In the end, the goal is the sa1nc--peace, peace for

oureelve£ and our children and our children's children.

...
New Era in Asia

~
~

1971 has been a year of momentous political changes in
Asia.

All center about China, that vast home of one-fourth

the people on tns globe.

Ironically, although a change in

American policy toward China set off the chain reaction, in
Indochina our nation ' s blood and treasure are still being
shed in a war founded on a myth that has now been discarded.
I would like to talk to you today about China, the fastchanging scene in Asia, and the relationship of the war in
Indochina to what is taking place.
There is an ancient Chinese proverb which says "the
journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step ."
year, the roads in the Far East have all led to Peking.

This
And

the first step which started these journeys was taken by the
man who bears much of the responsibility for creating the
emotional climate that shackled America ' s Asia policy for
almost a quarter of a century .

A principal creator of the

mythical Communist Chinese dragon, seemingly ready to gobble
up its neighbors, became the one to slay the myth.

The policy

perpetrated by this fraud has been the most misguided and illfated chapter in the history of American foreign policy.
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A bit of perspective is needed to relate our past
policy toward China to what is taking place in Asia today.
Following the Communist takeover in 1949 the American political
scene was dominated by an emotional witch hunt to find the
culprits "who lost China."

Americans did not understand

that China was never ours to lose.

Yet the fruits of

McCarthyism became firmly rooted as the major planks of our
foreign policy in the Far East.

Following the Korean War,

the United States erected a ring of treaties designed to
choke off what were thought to be China's aggressive designs.
The SEATO Treaty, the mutual defense treaties with the
Republic of China, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea all formed links in the
chain.

With these treaties came U.S. bases, U.S. troops to

man the bases, billions of dollars in military aid, and
advisors to show our Allies how to use the arms we gave them.
But, the reality is that while we have seen China as a
reckless, belligerent and powerful dragon to be contained,
China has seen itself as a weak, underdeveloped country trying
to pull itself up by its own economic boot straps, minding its
own political business.

The Chinese have viewed the United

- 3 -

States efforts to contain China simply as an extension of
the Western World's efforts to dominate and exploit China
over the last 150 years.
Now, after these many years of confrontation and
hostility, the United States and China have taken farreaching steps on the journey to restoration of normal,
friendly relations between our countries and our peoples.
The significance of President Nixon's visit to China does
not lie in the words of the Shang hai Communique, or in any
dramatic moves by either country, but in what it symbolizes
and the waves of change it set in motion:
It meant the death knell for the long-discredited
policy of attempting to contain a China which is not
aggressive or expansionistic.
It meant an end to our missionary approach toward the
nations of Asia, a policy of "Uncle Sam knows best."
It meant that the United States recognizes that its
ability to influence the course of events in Asia is quite
limited.
It meant that we are beginning to deal with the world
as it is and not as we would like it to be.

- 4 The President's trip has already had profound meaning
for future United States policy and relationships throughout
Asia.

The tree of relationships in Asia, and, indeed, in the

world, was shaken by the U.S.-China initiative and the
outline of what the tree will look like in the future is now
becoming discernible.
As you know, Senator Scott and I spent sixteen days in
China last April and May, at the invitation of the Chinese
Government.

Let me say a few words about my impressions

because I believe that what is taking place in China has a
great bearing on why the world's leaders are looking and
listening to Peking as never before.
The contrast between the old China and the new is
nothing short of remarkable.

To be sure, it is a classless,

controlled society; there is as yet no real intellectual
freedom.
not exist.

And the free enterprise system, as we know it, does
But China has always been a controlled society.

The difference is that before 1949 it was controlled for the
benefit of a small elite, now it is controlled for the benefit
of the masses.

If we have learned one truth from our

experiences in Asia over the last quarter century, it should

